Preamble 21 to 30
(21) Protecting journalistic sources and confidential communications is consistent with and contributes to the protection of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. It is also crucial for safeguarding the ‘public watchdog’ role of media service providers and, in particular investigative journalists in democratic societies and for upholding the rule of law.
In light thereof, ensuring an adequate level of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications requires that measures for obtaining such information be authorised by an authority that can independently and impartially assess whether it is justified by an overriding reason of public interest, such as a court, a judge, a prosecutor acting in a judicial capacity, or another such authority with competence to authorise those measures in accordance with national law.
It also requires that surveillance measures be subject to regular review by such an authority to ascertain whether the conditions justifying the use of the measure in question continue to be fulfilled. That requirement is also met where the purpose of the regular review is to verify whether the conditions justifying an extension of the authorisation for the use of the measure have been fulfilled.
(22) It should also be recalled that, in line with the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to effective judicial protection presupposes, in principle, being informed in due time, without jeopardising the effectiveness of ongoing investigations, of the surveillance measures taken without the knowledge of the person concerned in order to effectively exercise that right.
In order to further strengthen that right, it is important that media service providers, journalists and persons who have a regular or professional relationship with them are able to rely on an adequate assistance when they exercise that right.
Such assistance could be of legal, financial or other nature, for example providing information on available judicial remedies. Such assistance could be effectively provided, for example, by an independent authority or body or, where no such authority or body exists, a self-regulatory body or mechanism. It is not the purpose of this Regulation to harmonise the concepts of ‘detain’, ‘inspect’, ‘search and seizure’ or ‘surveillance’.
(23) The protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications is currently regulated heterogeneously in the Member States. Some Member States provide an absolute protection against coercing journalists to disclose in criminal and administrative proceedings information that identifies their source, including communications that are held under a commitment of confidentiality.
Other Member States provide a qualified protection confined to judicial proceedings based on certain criminal charges, while others provide protection in the form of a general principle. That leads to fragmentation in the internal market for media services and uneven standards of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications across the Union. To that end, this Regulation introduces common minimum standards of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications with regard to coercive measures used by Member States to obtain such information.
For the purpose of ensuring the effective protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications, Member States should not take such measures, including the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, in relation to media service providers, their editorial staff or any persons who, because of their regular or professional relationship with a media service provider or its editorial staff, might have information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications.
(24) Media professionals, in particular journalists and other media professionals involved in editorial activities, work increasingly on cross-border projects and provide their services to cross-border audiences and, by extension, to media service providers.
As a result, media service providers are likely to face barriers, legal uncertainty and uneven conditions of competition. Therefore, the protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications requires harmonisation and further strengthening at Union level. That should be without prejudice to further or absolute protection at national level.
(25) Intrusive surveillance software, including, in particular, what is commonly referred to as ‘spyware’, represents a particularly invasive form of surveillance over media professionals and their sources.
It can be deployed to secretly record calls or otherwise use the microphone of an end-user device, film or photograph natural persons, machines or their surroundings, copy messages, access encrypted content data, track browsing activity, track geolocation or collect other sensor data, or track activities across multiple end-user devices.
It has dissuasive effects on the free exercise of economic activities in the media sector. It jeopardises, in particular, the trusted relationship of journalists with their sources, which is the core of the journalistic profession. Given the digital and intrusive nature of such software and the use of devices across borders, it has a particularly detrimental impact on the exercise of economic activities by media service providers in the internal market.
It is therefore necessary to ensure that media service providers, including journalists, operating in the internal market for media services can rely on robust harmonised protection in relation to the deployment of intrusive surveillance software in the Union, including where Member State authorities resort to private parties to deploy it.
(26) Intrusive surveillance software should only be deployed where it is justified by an overriding reason of public interest, it is provided for in Union or national law, it is in compliance with Article 52(1) of the Charter as interpreted by the Court of Justice and with other Union law, it has been authorised ex ante or, in exceptional and urgent cases, subsequently confirmed by a judicial authority or an independent and impartial decision-making authority, it occurs in investigations of offences listed in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order of a maximum period of at least three years or in investigations of other serious offences punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order of a maximum period of at least five years, as determined by the national law of that Member State, and provided that no other less restrictive measure would be adequate and sufficient to obtain the information sought.
According to the principle of proportionality, limitations can be made to an individual’s rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union. Thus, as regards specifically the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, it is necessary to ascertain whether the offence in question attains a threshold of seriousness as laid down in this Regulation, whether, following an individual assessment of all the relevant circumstances in a given case, the investigation and prosecution of that offence merit the particularly intrusive interference with fundamental rights and economic freedoms consisting in the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, whether there is sufficient evidence that the offence in question has been committed, and whether the deployment of intrusive surveillance software is relevant for the purpose of establishing the facts related to the investigation and prosecution of that offence.
(27) Public service media providers play a particular role in the internal market for media services by ensuring that citizens and businesses have access to a diverse content offering, including quality information and impartial and balanced media coverage, as part of their remit as defined at national level in line with Protocol No 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States, annexed to the TEU and the TFEU.
They play an important role in upholding the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, enabling people to seek and receive diverse information, and in promoting the values of democracy, cultural diversity and social cohesion. They provide a forum for public discussion and a means of promoting the broader democratic participation of citizens.
The independence of public service media providers is key during electoral periods to ensure that citizens have access to impartial quality information. However, public service media providers can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference, given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. That risk is exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to balanced coverage by and independent governance of public service media providers in the Union.
Both the communication from the Commission of 13 July 2022 entitled ‘2022 Rule of Law Report’ and the 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom confirm the fragmentation of such safeguards and point to risks stemming from inadequate funding. As shown by the European Audiovisual Observatory in its 2022 report entitled ‘Governance and independence of public service media’, guarantees for the independent functioning of public service media providers vary across the Union, with differences in their scope and the level of detail in national approaches.
(28) Legal frameworks to ensure balanced coverage by public service media providers vary across the Union. Moreover, rules vary across the Union as regards the appointment and dismissal of the management of public service media. For instance, while most national legal orders set out several grounds for dismissal, others do not provide for any specific rules. Where rules exist, they are, in some cases, insufficient or are not effective in practice.
There are also cases where legislative reforms in Member States have increased governmental control of public service media, including as regards the appointment of heads or members of the management board of public service media. Approaches to ensuring the adequacy and predictability of funding for public service media providers also diverge across the Member States. Where safeguards do not exist or are insufficient, there are risks of political interference in the editorial line or governance of public service media.
Not having safeguards for the independence of public service media providers or having insufficient ones could also lead to a lack of stability in funding, thus exposing public service media providers to the risk of political control or further political control.
That could lead to cases of partial reporting or biased media coverage by public service media providers, instances of interference by the government in the appointment or dismissal of their management or arbitrary adjustments to or the unstable funding of public service media providers. All of that negatively affects the access to independent and impartial media services, thereby affecting the right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter, and could lead to a distortion of competition in the internal market for media services, including for media service providers established in other Member States.
(29) In national media environments characterised by a co-existence of public and private media service providers, public service media providers contribute to the promotion of media pluralism and foster competition in the media sector by producing a wide range of content that caters to various interests, perspectives and demographics and by offering alternative viewpoints and programming options, which provides a rich and unique offering.
Public service media providers compete with private media undertakings and online platforms, including those established in other Member States, for audiences and, where applicable, for advertising resources. That concerns commercial broadcasters in both the audiovisual and radio sectors and publishers, and is particularly true in the current digital media environment in which all media expand into the online sphere and increasingly provide their services across borders. Where such a dual and competitive media market, which is distinctive for large parts of the Union, is functioning well, it ensures a diverse and qualitative supply of media services in all sectors.
However, where public funding does not serve to fulfil the remit benefitting all viewers but, instead, serves partisan views, due to political interference in governance or the editorial line, it could affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent contrary to the common interest. The Court of First Instance has confirmed that public service broadcasting can have its state funding declared compliant with the provisions of the TFEU on State aid only inasmuch as the qualitative requirements set out in the public service remit are complied with.
(30) While the risk of what is commonly referred to as ‘media capture’ is relevant for the entire market for media services, public service media providers are particularly exposed to such a risk, given their proximity to the state. Diverging or insufficient safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media providers could prevent or disincentivise media service providers from other Member States from operating in or entering a given media market.
While independent media undertakings invest their resources in high-quality reporting which complies with journalistic standards, certain ‘captured’ public service media providers which do not comply with such standards could provide imbalanced reporting, while being subsidised by the state. The competitive advantage that independent media can obtain through independent reporting could be lessened as ‘captured’ public service media providers might unduly retain their market position. Politicised media markets can affect advertising markets as a whole because businesses have to factor in politics in addition to devising effective advertising campaigns.
If public service media providers, which are usually considered as trusted sources of information, provide biased coverage on the political or economic situation or concerning specific economic actors as a result of being captured, that might also reduce the ability of undertakings to inform themselves properly about the economic situation in a given market and, therefore, their ability to take informed business decisions. Such capture could therefore adversely impact the functioning of the internal market.
Finally, as a result of biased reporting by certain ‘captured’ public service media providers in some Member States, citizens might turn to alternative sources of information, in particular those available on online platforms, which might further weaken the level playing field in the internal market.
Note: This is the final text of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) - Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of 11 April 2024.